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THE: PUBLIC Authority may be described as a special public corpora-
tion whose obligations are payable solely from its revenues or property,
or both, without recourse to taxes and special assessments.1 Although
the authority has long occupied a significant place among Anglo-American
governmental units,' it is doubtful whether its advantages have been
fully appreciated or even understood. Yet these advantages are many.
Since the authority depends for economic survival upon its own earn-
ings rather than upon legislative largess, a greater degree of operating
efficiency necessarily results. Where constitutional or statutory debt
limits preclude further borrowing, the authority provides a municipality
with a convenient credit base without exceeding the debt limit or placing
an undesired burden upon the taxpayer. And, functioning as a corporate
entity, the authority not only permits speed and flexibility in adminis-
tration but also places legal liability where it belongs - on the enter-
prise itself.
INCORPORATION, STRUCTURE, AND POWERS
The public authority in this country has, in general, been organized
in one of three ways: (a) by special act of the State legislature estab-
lishing a specific corporate instrumentality for effecting a particular
purpose, viz., construction and operation of a bridge, tunnel, health
resort, produce market; (b) by a permissive general statute authorizing
the incorporation of an improvement authority in areas of a given popu-
lation to accomplish a variety of purposes; (c) by a permissive general
statute enabling the electorate of a defined geographical area to incor-
porate as a public corporation by vote at a special election.
Incorporation by Special Act. The legislature of the State of New
York has adhered to the method of incorporating specific authorities
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1. While the authority is in many respects similar to the improvement or special
assessment district, the two may be distinguished by their financing methods. The
authority depends solely on its revenues to meet obligations while district obligations
are paid either by special assessments on the property benefitted or by exercise of the
general taxing power. See Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements As Affected
By Constitutional Debt Limitations (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 177, at 203, n. 115.
2. Id. at 202, n. 111. On the Port of London Authority, which has been the
pattern of American authorities, see OwEN, THE PORT OF LONDON (1927).
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to carry out particular purposes. Including the Port of New York
Authority there are some thirty-one authorities in the State engaged
in the following activities :' bridge and tunnels,4 parks,* marketing,' pub-
lic utilities,' housing,' and a miscellaneous category embracing a health
institution,9 a natural history planetarium,10 an industrial exhibit," a
war memorial,' and a sewerage authority." Analysis and comment upon
the procedure followed in this state illumines similar practices elsewhere."'
New York follows, with minor exceptions, a uniform pattern in the
creation of its various authorities. They are designated "public benefit
corporations," bodies corporate and politic,"0 and endowed with either
a limited or perpetual corporate existence.10 Membership to the direc-
torate is appointive for fixed periods, the power of appointment and the
corresponding power of removal being vested in either the governor,
the mayor of a city, or some other governing body. The directors or
trustees of the authorities receive no stipulated compensation other than
reasonable expenses. Included among the powers of the corporate author-
ity are the right to sue and be sued, to use a corporate seal, to hold and
acquire real and personal property, to make by-laws for the management
3. See Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 1, at 201, n. 119; see also THE Ponr oF
NEW YoRm AUTHOaRY: A MoNOGRAPn (1936).
4. See, e.g., New York State Bridge Authority (N. Y. Laws 1932, c. 548, as
amended by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 67).
5. See, e.g., Pelham-Port Chester Parkway Authority (N. Y. Laws 1933, e. 63).
6. Lower Hudson Regional Market Authority (N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 231, as amended
by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 844).
7. Power Authority of the State of New York (N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 772, as amended
by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 448).
S. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 4 as amended by N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 310.
9. Saratoga Springs Authority (N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 203).
10. The American Museum of Natural History Planetarium Authority (N. Y.
Laws 1933, c. 214, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 816, 817).
11. Industrial Exhibit Authority (N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 246, as amended by N. Y.
Laws 1934, c. 304).
12. New York State World War Memorial Authority (N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 819).
13. Buffalo Sewer Authority (N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 349).
14. See, e.g-, California Toll Bridge Authority, Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 763; Panama
City Port Authority, Fla. Spec. Acts 1935, c. 17643; Mackinac Bridge Authority, Mich.
Pub.. Acts Extra Sess. 1934, No. 35; Hackensack River Sewerage Authority, N. J.
Laws 1933, c. 373.
15. This designation is designed to establish te authorities as state instrumentalities
and thereby achieve tax exemption for the obligations issued. See p. 26 of seq., infra.
16. The marketing [note 6 supra] and public utility [note 7 supra] authorities have
been endowed with perpetual existence. Limited corporate existence obtains, for example,
in the case of the Saratoga Springs Authority [note 9 supra], Jones Beach State Park-
way Authority, N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 70, and the New York State Bridge Authority
[note 4 supra]. In the absence of an express limitation on duration, a "termination"
section is usually provided, vir., "whenever all of the bonds issued by the authority shall
have been redeemed and/or cancelled, the authority shall cease to exist * * *"
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and regulation of its affairs, to enter into contracts, and, in certain in-
stances, to exercise eminent domain proceedings.' The authority may
incur debt and issue its own bonds, which may be sold at public or private
sale, although the total issue is not permitted to exceed a fixed amount.18
Each act creating an authority expressly immunizes the city, county or
state governments from liability on the authority's debt,1 and the bonds
of the authority are specifically exempted from state taxation." Usually
a mortgage on enterprise property is not specifically authorzed,21 the
security device in New York being an hypothecation of enterprise reve-
nues or tolls, or both.
The terms of the several New York acts empower an authority to
pledge all of its tolls and revenues over and above operating expenses
for principal of and interest on bonds issued by the authority, to covenant
with the bondholders to charge such fees and tolls as shall be sufficient
to provide revenue for debt service, to enter into agreements with respect
to restrictions covering the disposition of toll and revenue funds, to
establish sinking funds and provide for the payment of a certain pro-
portion of revenues to such funds, to enter into agreements to create
other reserve funds and to covenant with the bondholders governing
the management and investment of such funds as well as sinking funds,
to enter into agreements respecting restrictions upon future issues of
bonds, and to contract with bondholders as to the uses to which the
facilities of the authority may be employed.22
17. E.g., Henry Hudson Parkway Authority [note 5 supra]; Lower Hudson Re-
gional Market Authority [note 6 supra].
18. Thus, the New York City Tunnel Authority may become obligated for an
amount up to $200,000,000; the Saratoga Springs Authority may not exceed a debt of
$5,000,000.
19. The statutory provisions of several acts suggest that the State might assume
liability in the event of default. See e.g., the Jones Beach Parkway Authority Act
[note 16 supra] §6(4); see also, Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State, 243 N. Y.
231, 153 N. E. 58 (1926).
20. The New York enactments, being contractual in character and presumably made
for a consideration received or supposed to be received by the State, would appear to
be outside the scope of the State constitutional provision [Article VIII, § 1, Const. 1846]
empowering the State legislature to alter corporate charters. In other words, the
exemption is not a mere privilege.
21. But in the legislative acts of two authorities, [Bethpage Park Authority, N. Y.
Laws 1933, c. 801, and Buffalo & Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority, N. Y. Laws 1933,
c. 824], a mortgage on enterprise property is permitted.
22. The practical application of the foregoing pledge provisions may be seen from
the resolution adopted by the Buffalo Sewer Authority, June 1, 1936, authorizing an
issue of $8,250,000 of Authority bonds. The resolution is tantamount to a trust indenture
and contains the familiar covenants and provisions associated with the indenture instru-
ment, viz., authorization, terms, execution, registration and issue of bonds, form of
bonds, etc., particular covenants of the Authority, and provisions concerning the Fiscal
Agent. Compare this with usual provision "Concerning the Trustee."
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In addition to the foregoing provisions,23 the New York legislative
draftsmen have inserted in certain of the acts24 restrictive covenants
against future competition by the local or state government with the
facilities of the existing authority. For example, in tile Jones Beach
State Parkway Authority Act it is provided that:
"The State of New York does pledge to and agree with the holders
of any bonds that the state will not authorize the construction or
maintenance of any parkway, causeway, bridge, tunnel, street, road,
highway or other connection for vehicular traffic, which will be com-
petitive with Jones Beach parkway * * * *" 2
A covenant has also been included in virtually all of the New York acts
to the effect that the State will not limit or alter the rights vested in the
authority to collect such charges or tolls as are required to produce suffi-
cient revenue for maintenance and operation, or in any way impair the
rights and remedies of the bondholders "until the bonds, together with
interest thereon, with interest on any unpaid installments of principal
and interest, and all costs and expenses in connection with any actions
or proceedings, by or on behalf of the bondholders, are fully met and
discharged.""0
Permissive General Statute. The legislation enacted by the states of
Florida and Pennsylvania serves to illustrate the second type of authority
incorporation. The Florida Act2 is brief. Under its terms the Board
of County Commissioners may by resolution request the Governor to
appoint a Development Authority for the County.2 An authority when
so formed by appointment of the Governor is deemed a public corpora-
tion of the state in perpetuity, its corporate powers are in substance sim-
ilar to those prevailing under the New York legislation, and its obligations,
23. For the remedies reserved to bondholders, see infra, p. 24 c seq.
24. See, e.g., New York State Bridge Authority, [note 4 supra]; Lower Hudson
Regional Market Authority, [note 6 supra].
25. Where the legislative act leaves undefined the question of what constitutes
competition (assuming that ultimate definition is possible) future litigation would seem
inevitable. The act establishing the Jones Beach Parkvay Authority attempts to meet
the issue by particularizing the nature of a competitive facility. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 70,
§ 10. See also California Toll Bridge Authority Act, Cal. Stat. 1929, c. 763.
26. Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 70, § 10.
27. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 16974. See also, e.g., ALA. CODE A:,.. (Michie, Supp. 1936)
§ 1422 (improvement authorities to furnish water, sewerage, telephone, gas, electric,
light and power service).
28. The purposes which may be undertaken by a Development Authority are the
construction and operation of toll bridges and highways, public parks, playgrounds.
amusement places, fish ponds and hatcheries, school houses, court houses, community
centers, and club houses, and rural housing development. Id. at §7. Although the
statute is general in its terms, it is in effect tantamount to a special act, since it may
be employed only by counties having a population between 15,500 and 16,000 in the
last census.
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which may be issued either in the form of mortgage bonds or revenue
bonds, are expressly made its own debt.
Under the Pennsylvania legislation, authorities may be established by
both counties of the second class29 and municipalities,80 with a similar
incorporation procedure provided for each. The municipal officials or
county commissioners may signify their intention of forming an authority
by appropriate resolution and advertisement of the resolution, and by
filing articles of incorporation with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
After they have been approved by the Secretary, the articles constitute
the charter of the authority.3 Membership to the directorate is by ap-
pointment of the county officials or municipal officials. Unlike New York,
the Pennsylvania statutes permit directors to receive compensation. No
remedy is provided expressly for bondholders in the event of default
by county authorities,32 but the Municipal Authorities Act specifically con-
templates the use of a trust indenture and provides remedies similar to
those used in New York.33 Apart from a novel provision stipulating that
upon termination of the authority its property vests in the municipality,
the Pennsylvania and New York legislation are substantially alike.
Permissive General Statute by Vote of Electorate. The "Improvement
Authority" Act of South Dakota is typical of this method of incorpora-
tion. 4 Under this Act the electorate of any geographical area within the
state coterminous with the boundaries of a city or town containing a
population of not less than five hundred inhabitants may, upon filing a
petition to the local governing body, request the submission to a vote at
a general election of the question of whether there shall be incorporated
29. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 16, §§ 4160-4161. These counties may create
authorities to construct, maintain, and operate bridges, tunnels, streets, highways, traffic
circles, airports, hangars, parkways, recreation grounds, public parks, swimming pools,
lakes and dams.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 53, § 2900(i). Municipalities may engage
in projects similar to those permitted second class counties [see note 29, smpra] along
with low cost housing projects, sewer systems, hospitals and subways.
31. Incorporation by certificate has distinct limitations as compared with the method
of incorporation by special act. For one thing, a general tax law repealing tax exemp-
tions is generally held not to repeal a special act containing tax exemptions in the
absence of an express repealer. For a recent expression of judicial opinion, see People
ex rel. Cooper Union v. Sexton et al., 247 App. Div. 371, 287 N. Y. S. 440 (1st Dep't
1936). Incorporation by special act buttresses the attempt to "freeze" state tax exemp-
tions.
32. Since the statute contemplates the execution of a mortgage, detailed security
provisions would appear to be unnecessary. In fact, the trust indenture entered into by
the Allegheny County Authority, which was incorporated pursuant to this act, and
contained in Article VIII the usual remedies of the trustee and bondholders including
the right of entry upon and operation of the authority enterprise. See Tranter v.
Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 At. 289 (1934).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936), tit. 53, §2900(j).
34. S. D. Laws 1935, c. 73.
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an improvement authority. An authority so incorporated may engage
in any or all of the following activities: water, sewerage, gas or electric
heat, light or power service, commodities or facilities.35 Upon incorpora-
tion, the improvement authority is deemed a public corporation in per-
petuity, with a directorate consisting of three members, designated a
"board of trustees" 36 and appointed by the local governing body to
serve without compensation. A power of removal is vested in the Gov-
ernor. The plenary powers conferred on the trustees, the immunization
of the state and municipality from authority debts, and the rights and
remedies given to bondholders, are substantially similar to the powers
granted under the New York Acts.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Delegation of Powers. That the States have power to establish public
authorities as agencies of the State government would appear to be no
longer open to question. Nevertheless, each new venture seems fated to
run the gauntlet of constitutional scrutiny by the State courts. Thus, only
recently, in Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority 3 the Pennsylvania
enabling act was attacked on the ground that, by empowering the county
commissioners to take the steps necessary to obtain the charter for the
Authority,-9 there had been an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, however, in accordance with
the usual rule, that the exercise of a specific privilege conferred by the
Legislature was not an improper delegation."0
Trespass on Home Rule. A more difficult question presents itself in
considering whether authority legislation encroaches upon municipal home
rule laws and is "special" or "local" either in its terms or effect. On
35. Id. at §3.
36. Id. at § 15.
37. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (180); Gaynor v. Marohn,
268 N. Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (1935); see generally FREuND, A.mtcazmAx .l.ixlTnrvAETv
LAw (1923) 118-124; Berle, The Expansion of American Admnistrathc La, (1917)
30 HA.v. L. REv. 430.
38. 316 Pa. 65, 173 AtI. 289 (1934). See also, Kelley v. Earle, 190 Ad. 140 (Pa.
1937) overruling Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 AtI. 501 (1936), (1937) 85 U. PA.
L. REv. 518, which had held the Pennsylvania General State Authority Act unconsti-
tutional.
39. See p. 18, supra.
40. It was also urged by the taxpayer that the act was in conflict with the consti-
tutional prohibition (Art. 9, § 7) against the loan of credit by any local unit of govern-
ment to a private corporation. The argument was summarily dismissed. Trantner v.
Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 80, 173 AUt. 289, 296 (1934). The identical
issue was raised and dismissed in the following recent cases: Gaynor v. Marohn, 263
N.Y. 417, 198 N.E. 13 (1935) ; Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N. F 740
(1935).
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an issue involving this particular type of legislative trespass, the pro-
tagonists of Home Rule are prone to "confuse its objective of making
popular government work, with the idea of local self-government." 41
The courts have not been free from this influence. The precise point at
which the interest of the locality leaves off and that of the State begins
lies in a penumbral zone. If a prohibition against special legislation inter-
feres with the public necessity for electric light systems, transit facilities,
power plants, bridges, and the like, sooner or later the courts are driven
to the expediency of whittling away constitutional or statutory restraints.
The judicial experience of New York State throws the problem into
bold relief. The Legislature in 193542 created a public benefit corpora-
tion, the Buffalo Sewer Authority, to deal with sewerage and sanitary
matters affecting the City of Buffalo and its contiguous territory. The
act was promptly challenged in a taxpayer's suit in Robdrtson v. Zim-
mermann43 upon the ground, among others, that by transferring to the
jurisdiction and control of the Authority the existing sewer system of
the city, the Home Rule Amendment44 of the State was nullified. The
Court of Appeals had already driven a wedge in the previously established
test as -to whether a law was "special or local" by ruling that inquiry was
not restricted to an examination of whether an act was general or local
"in its terms", the basic inquiry being directed to the question whether
the act was general or local "in its effect."' 4' The process had been com-
pleted in a later case when Judge Cardozo pronounced the proper test
to be
,, * * * that if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of
State concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it
are the concerns of the locality."
'40
Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals did not hesitate, there-
fore, in holding in the Robertson case 47 that although the act there in
question did interfere with the control by the City of Buffalo of its
sewerage system, it was, nevertheless, neither "special or local" in its
terms or effect.
41. MCGOLDRiCK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RuLE (1933) 3. See,
also, Weiner, Municipal Home Ride in New York, (1937) 37 CoL. L. REV. 557,
42. N. Y. Laws, 1935, c. 349. See Williams & Nehemkis, op. cit. supra note 1, at
206, for a further treatment of this Authority.
43. 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (1935).
44. N.Y. CoNsT. 1894, art. XII, § 2; N.Y. Laws 1923, p. 1765. See Weiner, loc. cit.
mupra note 41.
45. Matter of Mayor of City of New York (Elm St.), 246 N. Y. 72, 76, 158 N. E.
24, 26 (1927).
46. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467, 491, 167 N. E. 705, 714 (1929); cf. Admiral
Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241 (1912); Matter of Mc-
Aneny v. Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922).
47. 268 N. Y. 52, 60, 196 N. E. 740, 745 (1935).
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It may safely be said, in summarizing the present experience with
authority legislation, that the "surrender of Home Rule" arguments, like
the "delegation of power" claims, cut little or no judicial ice. If author-
ity legislation is to be declared unconstitutional, the courts are more
apt to find invalidity in the zone where restrictions imposed by constitu-
tional debt limitations have been disregarded.
Constitutional Debt Limitations. The enabling acts of virtually every
modern public authority either free the State and local government from
any liability for the debt of the authority or achieve the same result by
specifically denying the authority power to pledge the credit of the state
or local government for its obligations. The patent purpose of this type
of legislative restraint is to make certain that the bondholders shall, in
the'event of default, look only to the revenues and assets of the authority
and shall not "call upon the public treasuries to contribute."'" The
authority concept, however, has been challenged in the courts as being
violative of the intendment of the constitutional provisions with respect
to debt limitations, since it "attempts by indirection to permit the bonded
indebtedness of the * * * City * * * to exceed" its debt limit4 and as
a "fiction designed to evade the constitutional limitation on indebted-
ness,"50 thereby striking down the "safeguard against municipal pro-
fligacy."15
1
In the light of historical and economic considerations underlying the
purposes of the constitutional restraints, '52 the term "debt", it is dear,
had reference to "an indebtedness to be met in the future by taxation."O
The distinction between a pledge of credit by a municipality and a pledge
of revenues of a particular enterprise is fundamental." The former
creates a charge or lion upon the city's general revenues, and, conse-
quently, may properly be regarded as debt, while a pledge of revenues
conveys a right to coerce payment only out of the special fund impounded
by the pledge agreement so that recourse to the general tax fund is not
available. 5 Hence, a pledge of enterprise revenues has no relation to the
creation of a debt within the meaning of the constitutional limitations.
Perhaps the most comprehensive application of the special fund doc-
trine to authority financing is Department of Vater & Power of City
48. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 82, 173 Ati. 289, 297 (1935).
49. Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 62, 196 N.E. 740, 743 (1935).
50. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 At. 289 (1935).
51. Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 513, 85 At. 839, 843 (1912).
52. See Williams & Nehemkis, op. cit. supra, note 1, esp. pp. 177-181.
53. Bank for Savings v. Grace, 102 N. Y. 313, 318, 7 N. E. 162 (1886). Cf. State
v. City of Neosho, 203 Mo. 40, 82, 101 S. .W. 99, 109 (1907).
54. See Matter of Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N. Y. 464, 198 N. F_. 225 (1935).
55. Cf. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. City of Wagoner, 81 F. (2d) 209 (C. C. A. 10th,
1936).
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of Los Angeles v. Vroman.8 The Department is, essentially, an "inde-
pendent body" or special corporation engaged in the distribution of light,
heat and power for the City, and in the incurring of indebtedness it is
not regarded as the City of Los Angeles nor "controlled by the consti-
tutional provision" with respect to debt limitation.57 During the period
from 1910 to 1926, general obligation bonds of the City of Los Angeles
in the amount of $50,500,000 were duly authorized for electrical works
purposes. A power revenue fund was established, and in it were de-
posited the proceeds of the bonds issued and sold as well as all other
revenues for the payment of the debt. In 1933, the Department sought
to enter into a contract with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for
a loan of $22,800,000 for the construction of certain transmission lines
and facilities. The case came before the California Supreme Court on
petition of the Department for a writ of mandate to compel Vroman, as
secretary of the Board of Water & Power Commissioners of the City,
under whose jurisdiction the Department fell, to execute the agreement
in behalf of the Department. The principal contention of the respondent
was that the contract, if executed, would be illegal since a provision in
the contract requiring repayment to the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion out of the revenues of the existing electrical works of the City as
well as from the revenues of the new transmission system proposed to
be constructed would render the loan agreement outside the scope of the
special fund doctrine to which the Court was committed, and thereby
create an indebtedness within the purview of the constitutional prohibi-
tion."8 To this objection the court was unable to attach any "particular
significance." Whatever importance the objection did present, the Court
conceded, lay in the fact that the power revenue fund might prove to
be inadequate. In that event the taxpayers would be called upon to pay
taxes to meet the maturities on the general bonds of the City previously
issued, a burden, the Court observed, which existed prior to the loan
agreement and was not affected by it. The Court held the loan agree-
ment, and the notes which were to be issued as evidence of the loan,
not to be obligations of the City.59
56. 218 Cal. 206, 22 P. (2d) 698 (1933).
57. Id. at 219, 22 P. (2d) at 704; cf. California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly,
218 Cal. 7, 14, 21 P. (2d) 425, 428 (1933).
58. Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 275 Pac. 421 (1929); Garret v.
Swanton, 216 Cal. 220, 13 P. (2d) 725 (1932). For the theoretical assumptions of this
theory and its limitations, see Williams & Nehemkis, op. cit. supra note 1, at 192-197;
cf. Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935).
59. The California Supreme Court has handed down several other discursive opin-
ions on this question. In In re California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212
Cal. 298, 298 Pac. 485 (1931) the statutory provision for the segregation of toll revenues
of the San Francisco-Oakland Bridge into a special fund to which the bondholders must
look for payment was held not to create debt within the meaning of the constitutional
[Vol. 47: 14
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Of utmost importance in this question of constitutional debt limitations
are the precise terms of the security provisions. Of course, where the
hypothecation of revenues is employed as a security device, the ultimate
immunity of the taxpayer from liability for the authority's default is
assured. But the placing of a mortgage, particularly on an existing
system to pay for an improvement thereto, is regarded as having a dif-
ferent effect" The incidence of foreclosure"' would, it is contended,
tend to press the local government to turn to the tax coffers rather than
permit the enterprise to pass into private hands at a foreclosure sale.
This position, which has been adopted by some courts, 2 is not without
validity, especially where general mortgage bonds are issued to pay for
an improvement to an existing system. Where, however, the so-called
mortgage does not carry the right of foreclosure but merely provides for
a receiver or trustee63 to operate the enterprise and collect revenues, it
has been held that the debt of the enterprise is not subject to the general
taxing power.' This follows from the fact that the obligation is to all
intent and purpose a special fund contract.
The problem of the taxpayer's ultimate liability could be greatly sim-
plified by complete elimination of the mortgage instrument in authority
financing. It offers no greater protection than is afforded by an indenture
containing proper protective covenants or, for that matter, by an appro-
priate resolution of the authority itself. In preparing the indenture or
resolution, however, the draftsman should take care to specify distinctly
that the security extends only to the special revenue fund and that the
exercise of the power of foreclosure or sale is precluded.' For so long
as the authority's property is not subjected to the hazards of a fore-
limitation. The same authority was involved in California Toll Bridge Authority v.
Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425 (1933), but here the situation was complicated by a
state subsidy to the authority which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had re-
quired before taking the authority's bond issue. The Court overruled the objection that
the bonds were thus being transformed into general obligations of the state by the sim-
ple statement that "such transformation or transition [was] not apparent."
60. See, e.g., City of Joliet v. Alex,ander, 194 I1. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902). A clear-
cut decision by the New York Court of Appeals on the validity of a mortgage accom-
panying a pledge of revenues is not available. But see the Zimnwrmamnz case, 263 N.Y.
52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935), discussed in Williams & Nehemkis, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 206.
61. Foreclosure upon municipalities is rare; there is, nevertheless, no legal obstacle
to enforcement. Id. at 197, n. 94.
62. Id. at 198, n. 95.
63. See Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 At. 289 (1935) ;
Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. -. 481 (1935) ;
see also Alabama State Bridge Corporation v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695, 693
(1928); cf. State ex rel. Loseke v. Fricke, 126 Neb. 736, 254 N. NV. 409 (1934).
64. City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839, 295 S. ,V. 1004 (1927) ; Bankheat
v. Town of Sulligent, 155 So. 869 (Ala. 1934).
65. See generally 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §§ 1600-01.
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closure or sale, "the giving of a mortgage over property to be acquired
from the proceeds of the bonds to be sold" will not "change the status
of the bonds so as to make them debts * * * within the constitutional
inhibitions." 66 An indenture without the incidence of a foreclosure or
sale but with right of entry and operation should not be distressing to
bondholders where the other security provisions afford adequate protec-
tion- as is true with the preponderance of present authority legislation.
Certainly, in the case of any sizeable utility the right of foreclosure or
sale is at best a dubious remedy since the possibility of a purchaser with
available cash is remote. In the last analysis the bondholder's security
depends on competent management and adequate earning power. If
public management proves to be satisfactory, foreclosure is not neces-
sary; on the other hand, if the management becomes "political" or proves
to be incompetent, ousting of the management should provide adequate
remedy. 7
REMEDIES OF BONDHOLDERS
Enforcement of authority obligations secured primarily by special
revenue funds is to be distinguished from the enforcement of municipal
general bonds or special assessment bonds, for while the latter types of
obligation afford holders remedies which have had the benefit of judicial
sanction," the remedies of the holder of an authority revenue obligation
are as yet untried. Experience with this type of public financing has been
too recent to allow the crystallization of any body of remedial law. Since
much of the recent volume of authority financing has been stimulated by
depression factors, 69 it will probably remain for the recurrence of the
66. Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E.
481, 489 (1935).
67. This fact was appreciated in the proposed plan of unification of the rapid transit
lines of the City of New York. The Plan permitted the trustees for the bondholders
and the City of New York to invoke a change in the management of the proposed Board
of Transit Control by a new body known as the "Board of Managers." A foreclosure
sale and right to accelerate the principal of the bonds were expressly excluded. See
DEFINITIVE PLAN AND.UNIFICATION AGREEMENT PROPOSED FOR THE AcQuIsboTN AND
UNIFICATION, UNDER PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, OF RAPID TRANSIT RAILROADS
AND RELATED POWER PROPERTIES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORIC, June 22, 1936, at 118 et
seq.
68. See generally, Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of
Public Corporations (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rrv. 28; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 924, at
962; HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS (1936) 274 et seq.; Pershing, Revenue Bond Rem-
edies (1937) 2 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 262; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMISSION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WoRx, ACTIVITIES, PER-
SONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Part IV,
COMMITTEES FOR THE HOLDERS OF MUNICIPAL AND QUASI-MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS
(1936), at 16 et seq.
69. See, for the extent of financial aid by the Federal Government, Foley, Lejal
Problems Affecting the Non-Federal Phases of the Public Works Program (1935)
SECrION OF MUNICIPAL LAW, AMER. BAR Assoc., SUMMARY OF PRoc., 29-30.
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nadir of the economic cycle to bring about the conditions requiring the
exercise of remedial measures and their judicial definition.
Appointment of Receiver. The traditional right to the appointment
of a receiver of the property and assets of a defaulting private corpora-
tion has never been the lot of the creditor of the public corporation. 0
However, there would appear to be no real basis for the traditional
antipathy of the courts to the appointment of a receiver for an authority.
While it is true that the authority is an instrument of government, sub-
ject to .the control of the legislature, and that its officers are engaged in
the administration and discharge of public duties, the fact is that it is
not created for the administration of civil government and it lacks all
of the distinctly political attributes-' generally exercised by local govern-
ment such as .the police, licensing, taxation, legislative and judicial powers.
The averseness of the courts to the appointment of a receiver in the
absence of statutory authorization has consequently been overcome in
most, if not all, existing authority legislation. -
Trusteeship. On the other hand, a question remains as to whether the
courts will sanction the exercise of the rate-making prerogatives by a
trustee or other representative of bondholders of a defaulting authority.
In this case the inevitable contention will be that the default and entry
by the trustee or creditors has altered the public nature of the enterprise;
it will be urged that, while the covenant to maintain rates is valid with
respect to the duly constituted directorate of the authority, it may not
be enforced at the instance of private creditors "with arbitrary capacity
to make their will prevail as law." ' There has been no direct holding
on this point, but the courts have indicated that the intervention of the
trustee will be sanctioned.74
70. 2 CLARK, RacrvERs (2d ed., 1929) § 700; City of Enterprise v. State, 69 P.
(2d) 953 (Ore. 1937).
71. See Foley, PW.A and Revenue Financing of Public Enterprises (1935) SEco,;
OF MuxircpAL LAw, AmFm BAR Assoc., SummARY oF Psoc., 62.
72. Cf. Guardian Savings Co. v. Road District, 267 U. S. 1, 45 (1925); Yost v.
Dallas County, 236 U. S. 50 (1915). Iowa [IowA CODE (1935) § 12453] and Maryland
[MD. CoD AawN. (Bagby, 1924) art 75, § 141] have provided that creditors of municipali-
ties might appeal to equity for the appointment of officers to carry out such acts as
might be essential to satisfy a writ of mandamus. Cf. Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall.
181 (U. S. 1868). Certain jurisdictions have authorized appointments of receivers to
collect taxes levied for the payment of irrigation and drainage district bonds in default.
Legis. (1933) 46 HAnv. L. REv. 1317, 1320, n..24. In this connection it may be noted that
the National Bankruptcy Act would appear to be available to authorities within the lim-
ited provisions of the recent amendment thereto. See Public L. No. 302, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937).
73. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc., et al. v. Agnew e al., 80 Law Ed. 514, 518 (1937);
cf. Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U. S. 50 (1915).
74. See cases cited n. 63, .mpra.
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Accounting. In jurisdictions which consider the income earned by the
enterprise as a trust fund, the potentialities of equitable relief are ex-
tended: a bill in equity will lie to impress the special revenue fund with
a trust and the bondholder may not only secure an accounting with
respect thereto but control the application of the funds by a receiver."
Mandamus and Injunction. It would seem that mandamus should lie
for diversion of the revenue fund or failure to apply such funds in ac-
cordance with the priority of claims provided in the resolution or in-
denture. However, mandamus cannot be used if a statutory duty has not
been violated;"6 and a statutory basis for the writ will not be available
unless the statute expressly sets forth the order of priority or authorizes
the use of the mandamus to assure collection of tolls as provided in the
pledge agreement or resolution." Thus, if the statute merely empowers
the authority to enter into a contract with bondholders with respect to
the application of the fund, does the resolution of the authority or the
indenture with respect thereto constitute the imposition of a statutory
duty? The effort to determine a duty from implied powers may prove
difficult. But whatever may be the doubt as to whether a writ of man-
damus will lie, the bondholder is not helpless. Upon a proper showing
against actual diversion or misapplication of revenues injunctive relief
will be granted."8
TAXABILITY OF AUTHORITY BONDS AND INCOME
Although the argument has been advanced"0 that authority obligations
do not warrant the immunity from taxation accorded to municipal and
state obligations "since interference with borrowing for general gov-
ernmental purposes is no longer a consideration," this contention ignores
a major factor motivating the use of the authority device: the need on
the part of many local governments for an additional credit base with
which to finance necessary community improvements. The fact that the
authority lacks recourse to the credit of the municipality or the state,
or stands on its own feet supported by its own general credit, scarcely
75. See, e.g., Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A.
10th, 1932).
76. See State v. Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 74 S. W. (2d) 367 (1934).
77. Cf. Kelly v. Merry, 262 N. Y. 151, 186 N. E. 425 (1933). But cf. State ex reL
City of Vero Beach v. McConnell, 169 So. 628 (Fla. 1936).
78. George v. City of Asheville, N. C., 80 F. (2d) 50, 56, 57 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935);
cf. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 271 Fed. 958, at 964 (W. D.
Wash., 1921); Tyler County v. Town, 23 F. (2d) 371,373 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); Thomp-
son v. Emmet Irr. Dist., 227 Fed. 560 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915); Vickrey v. City of Sioux
City, 104 Fed. 164 (C. C. N. D., Iowa, 1900).
79. Miller, The Intergovernmental Problem in Taxation of Officers and Securities
(1936) 2 LEGAL NoTas oN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 3, 7.
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eliminates it as a vital function of contemporary local governmental bor-
rowing. Recent experience has increasingly demonstrated that when the
margin of borrowing permitted to the States and municipalities under
the constitution is absorbed, the authority becomes the only available
credit base with which local government is able to finance improvement
projects. This fact has apparently been recognized by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, for recent rulings have exempted authority bonds from
both the stamp"0 and income taxes."'.
While the instances in which income accrues directly to a state or
municipality from authority operations are relatively infrequent,82 the
Bureau has not yet had occasion to pass on the question of taxability
of income while in the coffers of the authority. Determination of the
problem should present no serious difficulties. Section 116(d) of the
current Treasury regulations 3 provides that "income derived from any
80. Opinion dated February 27, 1937, to Messrs. Hawkins, Delafield & Longfellow,
New York City, with respect to Marine Parkway. Triborough Bridge Authority bonds
have been held not subject to stamp tax in Communication to Chairman of Authority,
dated Feb. 27, 1937.
81. Communication to Messrs. Hawkins, Delafield & Longfellow, New York City.
In Article 22(b) (4)-1 of Treasury Regulation 86 there had been exempted from in-
come taxes the interest upon obligations of a State or any political subdivision thereof
as well as upon "obligations issued by or on behalf of the State *** or a duly organized
political subdivision acting by constituted authorities empowered to issue such obliga-
tions." For the purpose of the exemption "political subdivision" was made to include
"special assessment districts *** such as road, water, sewer, gas, light, reclamation,
drainage, irrigation, levee, school, harbor, port improvement, and similar districts and
divisions." Plainly, revenue bonds issued by an authority are issued on behalf of a state
or a political subdivision thereof. It may be presumed that, in carrying over the iden-
tical definition in Treasury Regulation 94, the Commissioner was not unaware that special
assessment districts are no longer the exclusive agencies for effecting municipal and
state improvements; and that many of the activities enumerated in the definition as the
function of the assessment district are now performed by another variety of public cor-
poration, the authority. See 3 FAxciAL. REPoRTm 84 (1936) ; Wall St. Journal, Feb.
4, 1937, p. 11, col. 2; cf. United States v. King County, Wash., 231 Fed. 6S6, 690 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1922).
82. Income would accrue directly to a municipality from the operations of an au-
thority where the municipality, for the purpose of achieving unified operation and man-
agement of utility properties, transferred such properties to a newly created authority
for operation jointly with new property to be acquired from the proceeds of a bond
issue. Under a lease arrangement the Authority might be required to pay a rental to
the municipality for such properties. A practical illustration may be found in the plan
proposed for the acquisition and unification of the rapid transit railroads in the City
of New York, which contemplated that the rapid transit lines and the related
power properties to be acquired by the City of New York should be leased to an Author-
ity to be known as the Board of Transit ControL See DEFiNrrsv PLAN AND UNmmCA-
noN AGREEmmNT PRoPossn FOR THE AcQuismTIoN AND UNnxcAnoN, UNDun Pumuc
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, OF RAPi TRAsrr RAmRoADS AND PRrATEO PoAM Porum-
TIES IN THE Crr oF Nmv YomuI (1936), at 146.
83. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 94 at p. 270.
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public utility or the exercise of any governmental function" and accru-
ing to any State or political subdivision thereof shall be exempt from
taxation. Regardless of the meaning which may be imputed to the
language of the section, it is not a strain upon common sense to assume
that there is a real distinction between income received directly by a cor-
poration or an individual, on the one hand, and income received by a
corporation or individual in the first instance, but which ultimately will
be diverted to a state or municipality, on the other hand. The Bureau's
position is stated in a General Counsel's Memorandum:
"Not only has the Bureau failed to tax the income of any State or
municipality but it has throughout this period of 22 years made no
effort to obtain income returns from States or municipalities, or to
determine by any other means whether any State or municipality
has had income of this nature. This persistent nonenforcement of
the tax against States may be reasonably explained only as indicating
a tacit construction by the Bureau in accordance with the inter-
pretation which has just been suggested." 84
Further indication of the Bureau's attitude on this question appears from
its interpretations involving questions concerning the taxability of the
income of employees of a city or state engaged in carrying on functions
which the Bureau characterizes as proprietary, i. e., non-governmental.
Although it has asserted that such employees could not escape from a
Federal income tax, it has never attempted to tax the income derived
by the States and municipalities from such activities."
The trend of the current interpretations by the Bureau leads to the
conclusion that Section 116(d) exempts income derived by a corpora-
tion from the performance of a public or governmental function pro-
vided that the ultimate recipient of such income is to be the State or a
political subdivision,80 and this conclusion is in no wise affected by the
purely formal requirement that the corporation receiving such income
in the first instance must file a return. Thus construed, the Bureau's
rulings are entirely consistent with Congressional intent that income re-
ceived by the States or municipalities irrespective of its source shall not
be subject to federal tax.8 7
84. On construction of this section compare General Counsel's Memorandum 14407
(G. C. M. 14407, xiv-1 C. B. 103) with Griswold, Income Taxes of State Liquor Mo-
nopolies (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 619, 621.
85. See e.g., S. M. 2232, C. B. 111-2, 83 (cafeterias in public schools) ; I. T. 2357,
C. B. VI-, 52 (county hospitals). See also Wood v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 919
(1934); Jamestown & Newport Ferry Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A.
1st, 1930).
86. This is not true, however, in the bridge cases where the tax, if paid, is refund-
ed. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, § 116 (e).
87. To regard the income of an authority as "profit" is to mistake the authority's
"personality". As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in another context, but pertinent to
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Some dicta in Helvering v. Powersss have occasioned misgivings to
those who regard the authority as a proper legal device for avoidance
of onerous constitutional debt restrictions. But it appears that the de-
cision injects no new element into the traditional body of tax law. In
holding as taxable income the salary of a trustee appointed by the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts to operate, for a limited period of time, a
private street railroad company and its properties, the Court in no wise
deviated from the settled judicial pattern of sanctioning a tax imposed
by either of the dual governments upon the other provided such tax did
not bear directly upon an exercise of the sovereign power. The Com-
monwealth was attempting to rehabilitate by State subsidy a private cor-
poration in order to enable it to carry on street railway operations; it
was not substituting public ownership for private operation and owner-
ship. The railway remained the property of the company, a private
corporation, and was operated for private profit."2 Plainly, in taking
over the management and operation of a private company for a period
of ten years, the State could not change the fundamental nature of the
private business theretofore conducted by the company. Such apparently
was the import of the Chief Justice's declaration that "the State cannot
withdraw sources of revenue from the Federal taxing power by engaging
in businesses which constitute a departure from usual governmental
functions and to which, by reason of their nature, the Federal taxing
power would normally extend." 9  With this in mind, the further declara-
tion of the opinion, "the method which the State may adopt in organizing
such activity cannot be regarded as determinative," ceases to be a caveat
against authority undertakings.
THE AUTHORITY IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
The pervasive modern public utility systems for the supply of light,
heat, power, water, transportation and communication have inundated
the arena of political government with economic zones which threaten
to render obsolete the traditional concepts of territorial government.
These economic zones are being administered in considerable part by
the instant discussion, "This is not like the case of a corporation having its own pur-
poses as well as those of the United States and interested in profit on its own account.
The incorporation and formal erection of a new personality was only for the conven-
ience of the United States tb carry out its ends." Clallam County v. United States, 263
U. S. 341, 345 (1923). See also, People ex tel. Rogers v. Graves, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 272
(1936) ; Commissioner v. Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515, 519 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
88. 293 U. S. 214 (1934).
89. Government Counsel conceded this fact in his brief. It was also admitted that
the compensation of the Trustees was paid by the railroad company.
90. 293 U. S. 214, at 225 (1934).
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the public authority. 1 The significance of the authority device as a
means for permitting the functioning of economic government within
the framework of local governments is illustrated by the situation in
metropolitan New York. Although the political periphery of the gov-
ernment of the city embraces only the five boroughs which cover slightly
more than 300 square miles, its sphere of economic influence extends to
a region of some 5,528 square miles.92 And operating in this latter area
is a group of authorities performing a variety of functions, some of
which cannot be carried on efficiently, and some not at all, by a local
governmental unit.93
The advantage flowing from the subordination of artificial political
boundaries to more pertinent economic lines is, however, often counter-
acted by the incorporation of a multitude of authorities within the same
area for a variety of purposes, some of which are overlapping. This
proliferation tends to create a system of government by uncoordinated
authorities, which, as a result of complex and unique functional differ-
ences, renders ultimate public control ineffectual. It is true, of course,
that each of the individual authorities performs a specialized function
and in a narrow sense represents planned activity. But of the public
corporations which have been considered, The Port of New York Author-
ity alone has succeeded in carrying out a scientifically determined program
of regional planning. Under unified management and control the Port
Authority has provided an economically adequate solution to the harbor,
bridge, tunnel, railroad, and freight distribution problems of the New
York metropolitan area. In the sphere of planning the Port Authority-
has served a two-fold purpose: it has provided a mechanism for con-
sultation among various local governments for the development of in-
tegrated programs of related activities, and in the interstate sector of
its operations it has projected blueprints for the development of broad-
gauge harbor, port, communication and traffic facilities. In short, through
a functional adaptation of the public corporation The Port of New York
91. Under Congressional legislation now pending the scope of the authority is to.
be extended vastly. See H. R. Doc. No. 261, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) at 3; N. Y.
Times, June 4, 1937, p. 12, col. 3.
92. This is, broadly speaking, the metropolitan area covered by the planning sur-
veys of the Regional Plan Association, Inc., New York, a non-governmental body
which has developed comprehensive plans for the region. See, 1 REGIoNAL PLAN F
Nmv YORK AND ITs ENVIRONS, THE GRAPHIC REGIONAL PLAN (1929) at 127.
93. These authorities are as follows: The Port of New York Authority, the New
York City Tunnel Authority, the Triborough Bridge Authority, the Marine Parkway
Authority, the Henry Hudson Parkway Authority, the Bethpage Park Authority, the
Pelham-Port Chester Parkway Authority, the Jones Beach State Park Authority, the,
Rockland Westchester Hudson River Crossing Authority, the New York City Housing
Authority. Although operating within this metropolitan region, the Delaware River
Joint Commission does not, of course, impinge upon the government of the City of New
York. It is, nevertheless, illustrative of the point vis-a-zis Philadelphia and Camden.
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Authority is effectively bridging the hiatus which exists between economic
and political spheres of government.
In marked contrast to the high degree of integration evidenced by
The Port of New York Authority, the haphazard establishment of
separate authorities in response to immediate political or social exigencies
and in many instances having no direct relation to a farsighted or com-
prehensive program of regional planning, results only in multiplying the
existing confusion of metropolitan government and affecting adversely
the marketability of security obligations by creating additional layers
of government with concomitant administrative problems. The marketing
difficulty is caused by the fact that the authority is largely dependent
upon its own peculiar market, which is of a limited institutional char-
acter,94 for the distribution and refunding of its securities. The sporadic
flotation of authority issues will inevitably result in a premature satura-
tion of such market with its attendant reaction upon the necessary financ-
ing of state and municipal improvements.
Furthermore, where several authorities performing similar or identical
services are engaged in draining revenues within the same area, the result
of such uneconomic competition is apt seriously to affect the ability of
particular enterprises so situated to earn sufficient revenues to support
their individual debt. For this reason, if for no other, authorities per-
forming similar functions within the same geographical area would bene-
fit by a grouping of facilities under a single management and by a
consolidation of their respective debt, so far as practicable. The resultant
elimination of specific claims on the revenues of individual authority un-
dertakings in favor of a single charge on group facilities would seem
to be highly desirable. In this respect experience has made it increasingly
evident that neither fiscal, accounting, management nor operating factors
indicate any compelling reasons for adherence to the practice of financing
improvement projects as isolated authority undertakings. The principles
of regional planning dictate the contrary: 95 the record of performance
94. The authority bond, it should be noted, lacks the wide distribution and diversi-
fication of ownership and holdings characteristic of the industrial or utility security.
Authority securities, when not held by agencies of the Federal government, are pre-
dominantly confined to institutional investment portfolios. Thus, for example, the largest
blocks of The Pork of New York Authority 4s are held by 21 insurance companies,
the 434s by 35 insurance companies, the 4112s by 36 insurance companies. Banks, benevo-
lent associations and pension retirement systems make up the remainder of large insti-
tutional holders. See KEAXE, INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGs oF SEcURIIEs (1935-36) 2834-
2885. To a considerable extent, therefore, the distribution of the authority security is
dependent upon the receptivity of institutional holders. And as institutions usually have
a fixed policy governing the amount of any given type of security which will be held,
portfolios already bulging with authority securities will obviously act as a deterrent to
new underwriting activities for such securities.
95. See, for example, the methods outlined in REGIONL PL.I; AND ITS Euvor.ows,
op. cit. supra note 92, -at 134. The literature on the subject of regional planning is
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of The Port of New York Authority is persuasive evidence that unified
management of and control over group facilities with a general obliga-
tion possessing a claim upon all such facilities is the more desirable
financial policy." Some progress toward this objective has already been
made. In metropolitan New York, the Regional Plan Association, an
unofficial planning body, has. achieved signal results. Moreover, the
City of New York's new charter provides for a city planning commission
as a department of the City government; if endowed with a competent
and intelligent personnel, it may exercise a significant influence over
future authority development within the city. 8 The work of both these
groups might be supplemented to advantage by an "Authority Planning
Council" consisting of the Chairmen of New York State's thirty odd
authorities. Such a council could pool statistical and engineering data,
and, by cooperating with the Regional Plan Association and the local
governments, could readily become the planning body of the State and
region -certainly in respect to future authority development.OD
The authority mechanism as employed in metropolitan and regional
planning presents a further problem. Its financial structure has been
predicated upon earning power. In practice, this means that the successful
operation of an authority is dependent upon its ability to meet operating
expenses, maintenance charges and interest and to build up an adequate
surplus for sinking and reserve funds. Of course, if the test of economic
self-sufficiency is to be applied as a factor of conclusive importance, the
use of the public authority as a device for rendering various services
in the traditional fields of public service would not, by hypothesis, be
justifiable.
voluminous. For an excellent bibliography, see Regional Planning, 13 ENcyc. Soc.
SciENCEs 205 (1934).
96. In 1931, The Port of New York Authority adopted a policy designed to unify
the construction, maintenance, operation and control of its existing facilities and such
as were to be subsequently authorized to the end that the aggregate tolls and revenues
derived therefrom would be applied, so far as practicable, to the facilities as a group.
Accordingly, in 1935 (when market conditions had become favorable) all of the then
outstanding bond issues were refunded and consolidated into one type of general obliga-
tion possessing a claim upon the unified facilities. See, THE PoRT oF NEw YORIC Au-
THaoiuTy, Fifteenth Annual Report (1935).
97. The plans of the Association are embodied in a survey consisting of ten vol-
umes: REGIoNAL SURVEY OF NEW Yoax AND ITS ENv=Ns (1922-1931). They have
been carried forward by the Regional Plan Association in TEE GRAPnIC REGIoNAL PLAN
(1929) and THE BUILDING OF THE CITY (1931).
98. New York City Charter, c. 8, §§ 191-202. The charter becomes effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1938.
99. See, generally, Schmidt, Country Planning in the Ruhr District, XIV JouRNAL
oF THE TowN PLANNING INSTITUTE (1927-28) 47-52; Fuchs, Regional Agencies for
Metropolitan Areas (1936) 22 WASH. UNIV. L REv. 64 passim.
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It is, therefore, imperative that municipal and state officers should give
increasingly serious consideration to the problem of differentiating be-
tween public services which can be performed properly by an authority,
i. e., self-supporting enterprises, and public services which are not econ-
omically self-supporting. In the latter case, although the public corpora-
tion may still be utilized for administrative convenience, it must be
frankly recognized that its financial foundation must rest primarily upon
some form of taxation or special assessments. Not only may it be good
public finance to meet the cost of certain types of utility undertakings
by general municipal obligations, but it may be to the positive advantage
of the taxpayer to do so. The enormous appreciation in real estate values
in New York City would not have been possible in the absence of rapid
transit at a five cent fare. In this instance, the subsidizing of a public
utility has been distinctly advantageous to the taxpayer qua real estate
owner. However, where it is proposed to utilize the authority for the
operation of a public utility undertaking, and the ultimate economic inde-
pendence of the enterprise cannot be demonstrated, a mixed undertaking
may be the better financial policy; that is to say, additional support should
be given to the income derived from tolls or revenues by taxation or
special assessments or assessment quotas contributed by the towns and
cities within the area served by such authority.
Since the type of authority with which this discussion has been pri-
marily concerned is designed to amortize its debt solely from revenues
or tolls without recourse to taxation, continued neglect by public officials
in observing this distinction in the initial establishment of authorities
may unwittingly have the effect of accelerating their insolvency. Although
the State and municipal governments generally are relieved of liability
in the event of an authority's default, the occurrence of such defaults
would undoubtedly have a marked effect upon the credit standing of
the local governments concerned; and if such defaults were, perchance,
widespread, the ensuing legislative prophylaxis - if the history of con-
stitutional debt limitations has any significance - would unquestionably
impair the usefulness of the authority device.
1937]
